

Toward Fast and Autonomous Security Reaction Mechanisms: Application to Malware Propagation

SOTERN - IRISA, IMT ATLANTIQUE

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SuperViz meeting, Paris, March 11, 2025

Outline

- 1 Context: The Need for Security Automation
- 2 Work Summarization
 - Previous Work
 - Problematic and Research Questions
- 3 Demonstration: Opportunistic Reaction - The Case of WannaCry
- 4 Ongoing Work
- 5 Future Work

Outline


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Why Security Automation?


- Escalating Cyber Threats
- Faster Incident Response
- Reduced Human Errors

Research question

Are current security reaction mechanisms effective in mitigating rapid attack events?



GPS spoofing




Malware propagation → Selected usecase

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Previous Work [1]

The propagation behavior of WannaCry and NotPetya has been empirically studied



Contributions


- Measurement of propagation speed
 - Discussion on their propagation strategies
- Provide meaningful insights into malware propagation on a local network and on the Internet

Local network with 50 Windows hosts


[1] Do Duc Anh Nguyen et al. "How Fast does Malware Leveraging EternalBlue Propagate? The case of WannaCry and NotPetya". In: SecSoft Workshop. 2024

Problematic

Are current security reaction mechanisms effective in mitigating malware propagation?



Nearly 60% infections < 100s (WannaCry)



VEREFOO [2] process 70 user requirements in 100s

Centralized approaches can be slow and unscalable in preventing malware propagation

[2] Daniele Brighenti et al. "Automated Firewall Configuration in Virtual Networks". In: IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing 20.2 (2023)


Proposal

Flexibility and scalability in security function deployment

Microservices [3]

Microservices are based on the concept of breaking complex applications into multiple small services that handle specific functions and can be modified without affecting the others.


Fast reaction decision transmission: Decentralized and opportunistic synchronization



⇒ Not the optimal solution, but can stop the attack immediately

Research Questions

How can we optimize the placement of IDS microservices? **A Vertex Cover (VC) approach**




The distributed VC algorithm [4] is selected

- Making local decisions with local information
- Near-optimal solutions

[4] Jun Kiniwa "Approximation of self-stabilizing vertex cover less than 2". Symposium on Self-Stabilizing Systems (2005)


The Self-Stabilizing VC Algorithm



1. If I was not matched
 $\Rightarrow col_i := d_i$
2. If I was matched
 $\Rightarrow col_i := \max(d_i, d_k)$
3. If a higher-color node j point to me $\Rightarrow i \rightarrow j; col_i := d_j; cover_i := false$
4. If I point to a higher-color node but he does not point to me
 $\Rightarrow i \rightarrow null; col_i := d_i; cover_i := false$
5. If no one point to me and I have a smaller-color node $j \Rightarrow i \rightarrow j; cover_i := true$
6. If I am not the smallest-degree node $\Rightarrow cover_i := True$, otherwise, $cover_i := False$

Research Questions

How can we block traffic as close to the attack source as possible? **IP traceback**



Adapt the [5] solution to allow μ IDS traceback to where the attack source is

- Non-VC nodes embed its ID into packets for traceback

[5] Runhu Wang et al. "In-band network telemetry based fine-grained traceability against IP address spoofing attack". ACM (2021)

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Demonstration: Opportunistic Reaction - The Case of WannaCry

To what extent microservices augmented with opportunistic synchronization can mitigate the WannaCry propagation in a basic but realistic environment


Setup

- 4 Windows hosts, 1 of which contains the WannaCry executable
- IDS and firewall microservices: MirageOS unikernels vs ~~Unikraft~~ unikernels
- Switch emulation in GNS3: Ubuntu VMs

Scenario

- The distributed VC algorithm
 - ▷ Each node collects its local information by broadcasting
 - ▷ They decide to be in VC set (deploy an IDS) or not
- The opportunistic approach: The option field in the IP layer is used
 - ▷ Non-VC nodes: their ID, interface number, registration (i.e., 1)
 - ▷ VC nodes: node ID, interface number, DROP decision (i.e., 0)

Demonstration: Opportunistic Reaction - The case of WannaCry





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Ongoing Work

Putting our approach into more realistic scenarios
Layer-3 topologies shared by topohub [6]



Information on the topohub

- Multiple real topologies of different sizes
- Number of network nodes, locations
- Traffic volume, link utilization

[6] Piotr Jurkiewicz et al. "TopoHub: A repository of reference Gabriel graph and real-world topologies for networking research". SoftwareX. 2023

Ongoing Work

Generate legitimate traffic using traffic models

- Source models

- Poisson model: Input mean rate
- On/Off model: Input pack rate, probabilities of on/off process

→ Distribution of packet arrivals

- Source-Destination models

- Gravity model: Input volumn of traffic for each host
- **Independent-Connection (IC) model** [7]: Input traffic volume, popularity, ratio of forward and reverse traffic for each host

→ Results in a Traffic Matrix (TM), which represents the volume of traffic from a host to other hosts

⇒ Can take the TM directly into traffic generators

[7] Vijayi Erramill et al. "An independent-connection model for traffic matrices". ACM. 2006

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Future Work

Propose an empirical performance evaluation to the Journal of Network and Systems Management (JNSM)

Research questions

- How can we block attacks when requests and responses take different paths?
- How can we block attacks when no IDS sits between attacker and victim?
- How can we delegate knowledge of a removed IDS to other IDSs?
- How to secure the opportunistic communication?

Ending

Thank you for listening

Source code:

https://gitlab.imt-atlantique.fr/d22nguye/gns3_unikernel_testbed